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Families and the Republic
JOHN BRAITHWAITE
Australian National University
Restorative and responsive justice can be a strategy of social work practice
that builds democracy bottom-up by seeing families as building blocks of
democracy and fonts of democratic sentiment. At the same time, because
families are sites of the worst kinds of tyranny and the worst kinds of
neglect, a rule of law is needed that imposes public human rights obligations
on families. The republican ideal is that this rule of law that constrains
people in families should come from the people. Restorative and responsive
justice has a strategy for the justice of the people to bubble up into the
justice of the law and for the justice of the law to filter down into the justice
of the people. The role of the social worker is to be a bridge across which both
those democratic impulses are enabled to flow. The empowering side of the
social work role fits the first side of the duality where the will of families
bubble up; the coercive side of the social work role fits the second where the
justice of the law filters down.
Key words: social work, responsive regulation, restorative justice, demo-
cratic theory, families, social justice
Social Work and Structural Justice
My thanks to the contributors to this special issue for a thought-
ful and gracious set of contributions. When they arrived from Paul
Adams he apologized that there was too heavy an emphasis on
families and child welfare, bearing in mind the way Restorative
Justice and Responsive Regulation (Braithwaite, 2002) ranges across
all domains of law, business regulation and even peacemaking
in international relations. When I was a young sociologist, social
work was not my favorite discipline because it seemed to focus
too much on micro-solutions, pejoratively referred to as band-
aids, to problems of injustice that require structural solutions. So
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, March, 2004, Volume XXXI, Number 1
200 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
my energy was directed to studying questions like Global Business
Regulation (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000), the role of the IMF and
the WTO, how tax administration can become more effective in
getting rich individuals and powerful corporations to pay their
fair share of tax to support the welfare state, and the like. Some
of our responsive regulatory initiatives in Australia to persuade
multinational corporations to pay some tax seem to have been
surprisingly effective (Braithwaite, 2003), so it is important not to
neglect this part of our work.
We expect social workers to prioritize work with families, but
we can be surprised when evidence-driven tax administrators
do so. An intriguing development has been that a senior tax
official seconded to our research group, Jenny Job, together with
her colleague Monika Reinhart, has found that families hold the
key to tax compliance! This research (Job & Reinhart, 2003) set
out to test Robert Putnam's (2000) influential thesis that social
capital and trust in government is driven by civic engagement
and associational membership. Their AMOS analysis on survey
data from 1,999 Australian taxpayers produced a rich texture of
results the complexity of which I will not try to summarize. But
the basic result was that civic engagement of various kinds-from
not bowling alone, to volunteering, to political activism-had
only minor effects on trust in government institutions, including
the Australian Tax Office. Trust in family and friends (workplace
colleagues really) is what drives their model. If you learn trust in
your family, or failing that in your workplace, you trust strangers
more, you trust other government institutions more, and these
work through to higher trust in the tax authority. Perhaps it is
perverse that we sociologists should be surprised to learn that
families are much more fundamental than bowling leagues to
social capital formation and the cultivation of habits of citizenship
that enable the functioning of institutions like taxation that are so
fundamental to redistribution of wealth from rich to poor.
As Kristin Kelly (this volume) says, partnerships with com-
munity organizations are still important and are here to stay; there
are good reasons why these partnerships help secure improved
effectiveness and decency in how we pursue important public
purposes, from the protection of children to the environment. But
what a mistake for Braithwaite the young sociologist to fail to see
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that it is in families that most of us learn most of what equips us
to be effective democratic citizens in community organizations.
The New Zealand innovation of family group conferences is not
merely something the evidence now shows to have promise as
a way of confronting crime, delinquency (see Braithwaite, 2002;
Latimer, Dowden & Muise, 2001; Nugent, Williams & Umbreit,
2003) and the care and protection of children (see Neff, this vol-
ume; Merkel-Holguin, this volume; Pennell, this volume), it is
a strengths-based strategy for restoring families as a fundamen-
tal building block of strong democracies. Children are not born
democratic. They must learn to be democratic citizens-to listen,
deliberate, support others when their rights are abused, speak
out against injustice (Barber, 1992). For most of us these are gifts
of deliberative competence induced by participation in healthy
family decisionmaking. Many who miss out on these gifts in their
family lives learn them in schools that give children a voice. And
some who miss out in both these institutions are lucky enough to
get a job early in their life in a democratic workplace. The bowling
league and other civic associations matter, but are thin reeds
compared to family-school-workplace as pillars of education for
democracy. If the most important pillar of the three is the family,
then the social work road not taken by many young sociologists
of the 1970s was not a band-aid on deeper societal sores, but one
important path to healing wounds at their source.
David Moore shows in his contribution to this volume that
conferences are structured to "get to peace" before they seek to
"get to yes" (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991). This helps us see why
restorative and responsive peacebuilding has an important con-
tribution to make in societies in the process of putting down their
guns to recover from armed conflict. In peacemaking contexts like
the Bougainville civil war (in Papua New Guinea) we can see how
New Zealand-style conferences adapted to Melanesian traditions
are playing a major role in securing the peace (Howley, 2003).
Empirical research on what works and what hinders care and pro-
tection and juvenile justice conferences will help inform how we
can heal the wounds of children traumatized by atrocities against
their parents in a war, how we can help in dissuading them from
wanting to restart the war to avenge their family's suffering in the
next generation. By connecting the work of our micro-research
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and practice community to the peace movement we inspire our
mundane work with that wider significance. By connecting the
peace movement to the social movement for restorative justice
we can show peace activists a small way of acting locally to
teach the young how to be democratic through their personal
participation in protecting their sibling or mother from abuse,
in how to protect their friend from being bullied in the school
playground (Morrison, 2004). The peace movement can show the
social movement for restorative justice how to make the personal
political; just as restorativists can show the peace movement how
to make the political personal, how to act locally in a way that
gives our global aspirations for peace a more holistic grounding
in the relationships that daily preoccupy us.
We get to peace before we get to yes by seeing conflict resolu-
tion as about the transformation of relationships rather than just
bargaining over interests. Mediation reduced to doing deals does
not offer up human relationships that are infused with integrity,
that enable the trust and the social capital formation that Putnam
(2000) rightly saw as fundamental to a flourishing democracy and
economy. The evidence from observational studies is increasingly
consistent with Moore's (this volume) observations that open
expression of affect and a process that is shaped by the partic-
ipation of stakeholders rather than by professionals is critical to
the success of restorative processes in achieving the purposes they
set for themselves.
Caring for Children
Lisa Merkel-Holguin (this volume) shows the rapid growth
of child protection, as opposed to juvenile justice, family group
conferences from existing in five US communities in 1995 to over
150 by 2000, from 4 pilot projects in England and Wales in 1994 to
97 local programs by 200. While most of these programs are not
the mainstream in their locality, the spread has been surprisingly
rapid intra-nationally and internationally across at least 20 na-
tions. Merkel-Holguin suggests that a lot of the appeal of family
group conferences has been their fit with the idea of strengths-
based interventions. The notion of building out from the strengths
of children and families in turn fits with the aspiration of bottom-
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up education for democracy, a theme nicely developed in Merkel-
Holguin's essay.
Yet the family group conference is not a pure deliberative
democracy. Sometimes, as Joan Pennell (this volume) implies, the
social welfare professional must enter the conference by com-
municating a clear "bottom line" such as securing the safety
of a particular at risk child from a particular threat. Whether
emphasizing "bottom lines" up front is the most effective way
of securing safety is a question on which we have no empirical
evidence as far as I know. What I would want to assert is that
there is nothing wrong in democratic principle with "bottom
lines" so long as they are bottom lines that are clearly demanded
by a law voted through a democratic legislature. Bottom lines
that enforce a standard that is not a legal obligation of families,
that enforce merely a personal or programmatic preference of the
professional, are democratically unacceptable. Whether up front
through bottom lines grounded in human rights law or after the
event in court decisions that overturn conference outcomes that
abuse children's rights, a democracy will not be a democracy
unless it builds in checks and balances against tyrannies of the
majority, especially when the majority are adults and the minority
are children dominated by them.
As Philip Pettit (1996) has explained in his republican theory
of governance, the reason democracies are a good thing is that
they advance the protection of all of us, not just some of us, enjoy
from domination by others. Freedom as non-domination is the
condition a republican theorist of democracy seeks to secure. A
pure deliberative democracy where a primary group like a family
or extended family votes for their interests without interference
from legal principles from the wider demos might be viewed as
desirable if one's theory is of maximum democratic choice as a
good in itself. But if we value democracy as a means to the end
of freedom as non-domination, then we want to both nurture
richer deliberation of stakeholders and nurture the checking of
that deliberation by actors with an obligation to protect human
rights. Actually we want to do more. We also want to make
the deliberative democracy of citizens vulnerable to the rule of
the peoples' law (professionals communicating "bottom lines"
may be one way of doing this). And we want the rule of law
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to be vulnerable to the rule of the people. A family group being
able to call in legal aid to contest the legality of a bottom line
communicated by a professional at a conference is one way of
doing this. This helps the legal system to clarify what kinds of
bottom lines are democratically acceptable and which are not.
This is Christine Parker's (1999) idea of the justice of the law
filtering down into the justice of the people and the justice of the
people bubbling up into the justice of the law.
In Joan Pennell's (this volume), Paul Adams and Susan Chan-
dler's (this volume) and David Crampton's (this volume) contri-
butions, responsive regulation is seen as useful for reconciling the
tension between empowering democratic deliberation and inter-
vention to protect children. At the base of the pyramid informal
civic deliberation in families, communities and neighborhoods is
relied upon to prevent the abuse and neglect of children. Then, as
in Crampton's Figure 3, there can be escalation to more structured
family meetings that reach agreements on how to keep children
safe within their existing family When those protections cannot
give enough assurance against a grave risk or when experience
proves them to have failed, the next step in Crampton's pyramid
is family meetings that decide to remove children from their
parents and place them with extended family. The next rung of
the pyramid is formal foster care.
Adams and Chandler, Pennell, and Crampton have all grasped
the basic idea that responsive regulation is a way of thinking,
not a definite list of prescriptions. Some pyramids may spec-
ify moving an adult out of the family rather than a child, for
example, or moving an adult member of the extended family
into the household to keep an eye out for the rights of the child.
Indeed the superstructure of the pyramid can be redesigned by
democratic deliberation at the base of the pyramid. So a family
group conference might decide that there will be a trial period
of a family member attending an anger management program.
Further it might agree that if this fails and degrading tirades
of anger persist, there will be an escalation of intervention that
requires this person to move out and live with their uncle. Finally,
if the tirades still come back to haunt the family and spill into
violence, family members may resolve to escalate to lodging a
formal assault complaint with the police. Signaling in advance
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that these escalations will occur if interventions at lower levels fail
can be good protective practice. This is because it communicates
to the actors who need to change their behavior that if change does
not occur, this will not be tolerated. The pre-commitment to an
escalated response can motivate change because of the message
the pre-commitment gives that change is inexorable.
Later, the conference may resolve that if the tirades have
dissipated under the joint influence of the anger management
program and living under the firm hand of the uncle, conditions
may be set for a return to live with the family Signaling a pre-
commitment to deescalate in advance can also be good practice
because it offers a positive incentive for change. The idea of
responsive regulation is that it is better to be at the base of
the pyramid where democratic conversation does the regulatory
work, but that if escalation is necessary the decision to escalate
should always be open to revision, so de-escalation occurs.
A virtue of a restorative approach of plural deliberation at
the base of the pyramid is that the engagement of a plurality of
participants actually opens up new options in the middle of the
pyramid. For example, Crampton (this volume) refers to some
preliminary Ohio data that children are more likely to be placed
with relatives rather than in foster care when relatives attended
the family meeting.
While the accumulation of evidence on the efficacy of child
welfare conferences cited in this volume is encouraging, it is
early days and large studies with excellent designs are yet to
flourish. Some of the most crucial questions of conference design
are still being questioned by empirical evidence, as in the case
of Crampton's (2001) result that preparation time did not predict
success at diverting children from foster care into kinship care.
Lobbying for quality, independent research has paid divi-
dends for restorative justice advocates with criminal and juvenile
justice because early vaguely encouraging results have now be-
come higher quality, more decisively encouraging results (Braith-
waite, 2002; Nugent, Williams, & Umbreit, 2003). Independent
evidence is needed to contend with what Crampton (this vol-
ume) discusses as the neostatist backlash. Neostatists believe in a
heavy emphasis on state intervention and a greater emphasis on
adoption as the best option if children are maltreated. Cost-benefit
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studies of high quality may be needed to address the concerns
of critics who say family group conferences are too expensive
(Adams & Chandler, this volume). Adams and Chandler describe
the affectionate labeling of Hawaiian conferencing innovators as
"bungee jumpers". Of course most folk in welfare bureaucracies
are not bungee jumpers; they prefer to stand on the bridge and
watch to see if the jumpers survive. They may not jump until there
is evidence showing that it is unequivocally bad practice not to.
Strengths-based strategies are always vulnerable to worldly-wise
cynicism that a particular family, whose details are only under-
stood by this caseworker, is devoid of strengths and supports.
There are no extended family supports that will come if called
upon; the family does not have the capacity to make such difficult
decisions, and so on. Adams and Chandler also point to more
banal bureaucratic obstacles that need to be dealt with, like access
to flextime and overtime to allow conferences to be convened at
times like the evenings and weekends where maximum numbers
of family members might be able to attend.
There is also a tension between being evidence-based and
being democratic of course, as there is to tapping affect to moti-
vate change (Moore, this volume). What happens when citizens
vote for a solution that the evidence clearly shows makes such
situations worse? What should happen when emotion drives peo-
ple like stampeding cattle toward an outcome that the evidence
shows to be counterproductive? The other side of this argument
is that high quality evidence is no use if people are not motivated
to use it (Pease, 1998). Our biological inheritance is that we tend
not to engage our capacity for evidence-based reasoning unless
our emotions are harnessed to motivate us to do so. Why is the
evidence so strong with criminal cases that restorative justice
processes lead to more implementation of decisions than for cases
in control groups that went to court and other command and
control forms of processing (Latimer, Dowden, & Muise, 2001;
for child welfare conferences see Neff, this volume)? A probable
reason is that democratic deliberation leads to more commitment
to the decision than command and control by a court. But there
is also great practical capacity for monitoring. So, for example,
a next-door neighbor who promises at a conference to check in
Families and the Republic 207
on the family regularly to ensure that an undertaking is being
honored is likely to have more practical capacity to do so than
their welfare worker. What we need is a marriage of the evidence-
based philosophy and the democratic ideal. We need evidence-
based practitioners who provide conference participants not only
with a list of community and professional support options avail-
able for the kind of problem the conference is addressing but also
feedback on what the evidence says about when these interven-
tions are likely to be effective and ineffective. It is the amalgam
of deliberation, intelligent analysis of evidence and emotional
intelligence that has delivered the greatest accomplishments of
human beings, not deliberation alone, nor evidence alone, nor
emotion alone.
There is also a need to work harder at connecting restorative
justice practice to rich existing bodies of empirical research that
establish relationships between variables that are strongly in play
during restorative justice processes. An example of how to do this
is Rob Neff's (this volume) illuminating treatment of the issue of
procedural justice and how it can improve not only compliance
with legitimate authority but also the realization of quite a list of
family group conference principles (Neff, this volume, Table I).
Procedural justice is likely to be best secured by neither top-down
legalism nor by pure deliberative democracy, but by the law's
conception of procedural justice being contested by the people's
conception of fairness and by what citizens in a conference feel is
fair being constrained by procedural safeguards in the law.
Finally, there is a need to draw upon the methodological con-
tributions that have been developed in other fields. Joan Pennell's
(this volume) factor analysis of the objectives of participants in
family group conferences to form three factors-cultural safety,
community partnerships and family leadership-is a good exam-
ple. The factors appear robust empirically and are conceptually
evocative. There is another reason why this aggregating of objec-
tives into conceptual clusters is useful. This is as a response to the
critique that Andrew Von Hirsch et al. (2003) among others, has
made against my work-that every value under the sun seems to
be a restorative justice value, so there is no parsimony about it as
a normative theory.
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Domestic Violence
Peggy Grauwiler and Linda Mills (this volume) contend that
existing policy is not working to deal with intimate abuse. They
cite results from the 2000 National Violence Against Women Sur-
vey that only a fifth of all rapes and a quarter of all physical
assaults perpetrated against females by intimate partners were
reported to the police in the United States. Grauwiler and Mills
see restorative justice as having a lot to offer toward correcting
this situation, especially for women of color given the way au-
tomatic recourse to criminal prosecution for domestic violence
tends to play out more to the disadvantage of black than white
women (and men). Their idea of Intimate Abuse Circles connects
in an interesting way to the strengths-based theme of the last
section. Grauwiler and Mills argue that without blaming victims,
we should grant victims the dignity of having the strength to
concede that things they have done may have contributed to the
social dynamic that led to violence. The important thing is to
vindicate the victim by making it clear that what was done to her
was unjust and not deserved in any way. Once these things are
secured it makes no sense to treat the victim as someone who has
no power in the situation. She has the power to do things that
make her safer and the power to do other things that add fuel
to the emotional dynamic that leads to violence. Intimate Abuse
Circles comprise an approach oriented to assisting women and
men to acquire greater wisdom about things they sometimes do
that escalate violence as a stepping stone to designing a plan that
will actually work to prevent violence in the face of these cruel
realities. The analysis is courageously articulated in a way that
makes a good case for experimentation and rigorous evaluation
of Intimate Abuse Circles.
Kristin Kelly (this volume) sees the battered women's move-
ment as an exemplar of state-community partnership because of
the attachment it has always shown to both community-based
and statist responses to domestic violence. Kelly believes that
both community and state interventions can be strengthened. She
says liberal legalist trepidation that bolstering community inter-
ventions will mean reduced commitment to treating domestic
violence as a serious criminal matter is a false choice. Braithwaite
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(1998) likewise contends that hydraulic arguments about stronger
states weakening communities or markets, and vice versa, are
common but theoretically highly contingent contentions. It is also
a theoretical possibility that we can strengthen one institution in a
social system in a way that reinforces rather than weakens other
systems. Hence, it is absolutely coherent to struggle politically
for a social democratic dispensation of strong markets, strong
communities, and a strong state. Kelly's trilogy of institutions
makes families, rather than markets, the third key institutional
sector. The earlier discussion of Job and Reinhart's (2003) research
on families, community organizations, and state institutions of
taxpaying is actually a nice illustration from a completely differ-
ent domain of the fertility of Kelly's trilogy.
With domestic violence we can choose politically to struggle
for legal and policing reforms to make criminal prosecution ef-
fectively more available to victims of domestic violence at the
same time as we make family group conferences and commu-
nity support from battered women's shelters more effectively
available. If it is correct that restorative justice is a powerful tool
for securing respect for legal rights, but more powerful if it is
backed by the possibility of responsive escalation to litigated
justice, then an important way of securing equal protection of
rights is to make both restorative justice and responsive regu-
lation as available to the most powerless citizens as they are to
wealthy individuals, powerful corporations, and state regulators.
Too much of the debate around the advantages and disadvantages
of state versus community or family justice is about where the
imbalance of power will be greatest. My suspicion is that there is
a lot of contingency here as well. Sometimes an Intimate Abuse
Circle will dispense justice with less imbalance of power than
is found in a courtroom; in other contexts, the reverse will be
true. If this contingency claim is right then the greatest inequity
will exist when the powerful party has the capacity to choose
whether to go to court or to opt for restorative justice while the
less powerful party is forced to lump one option or the other. It
also follows that simultaneously struggling for greater access to
the justice of the courts and greater access to restorative justice
for weaker parties will strengthen their hand in conflicts with
better-resourced parties. The model in Figure 1 of Kelly's paper
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therefore seems fundamentally right with respect to justice. There
can be synergies between strengthening state justice, community
justice, and family justice where each enhances the capabilities of
the other.
The Language of Reform
The R Word
While the articles in this special issue make a good case that
regulatory theory has some use for changing how we think about
challenges like child welfare and domestic violence, regulation
does not always sit comfortably as a word to describe specific
interventions. Of course there is a brutal truth to the fact that child
welfare bureaucracies do regulate families as Burford and Adams
(this volume) explain in their introduction to this volume. Fami-
lies are also regulated by other actors in the community sector and
they self-regulate. It is not that pluralist regulatory theories are
unattractive as a way of describing and explaining the reality of
what happens in welfare practice. It is that at the normative level,
the R word is not the stuff of politically resonant practice. My
favored solution when deploying regulatory theory in a context
where the R word turns people sour is to use governance. For
those of us who use regulation in its broadest sense as governing
the flow of events, this works fine.
The Other R Word
The other R word is restorative. David Moore (this volume)
prefers transformative. For years people like David and myself
were working on conferencing in New Zealand and Australia
without using this second R word. Restorative justice was the
term of art in North America. My research group went along with
this mainly because we think social movements matter and they
don't get far unless they share a language that participants find
politically resonant. Also of course America matters in any kind of
global social movement politics in a way Australia does not. But
restorative has some negatives when we are dealing with abuse
and neglect in families. Do we want to restore patriarchal fami-
lies? No, we would rather transform them. Desmond Tutu would
reply that of course the South African Truth and Reconciliation
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Commission, which he conceives as a restorative justice initiative,
was not about restoring Apartheid. It was about restoring human
dignity, justice, and the rights that are fundamental to our hu-
manity. At the end of the day, it does not matter much that David
Moore is using the T word and I the R word, so long as we are
collaborating effectively to develop ideas, practices, critique, and
evidence that assist the same broad reform movement.
The J Word and the C Word
Another difference in language with David Moore's work is
that David and his colleagues like to speak of conflicts, whereas
I prefer to see restorative justice as about responding to injustice.
This is because of a desire to separate restorative justice from older
versions of mediation and alternative dispute resolution that
feminists in particular have found unattractive for application to
domestic violence and family law disputes. So it seems important
when a rape is being responded to for this not to be conceived
as merely a conflict about which a mediator is morally neutral.
Certainly the restorative justice facilitator must not be biased
against either side. Yet there is moral clarity that there are values
at the heart of restorative justice; fundamental is the value that we
must confront injustices and correct them as best we can. Again
David Moore can and does agree with this while opting for a
different default usage of language. His side of this argument
might point out that injustice is not a particularly apt framing for
a family group conference concerning a conflict over whether
a child should live with a father with a drug problem or an
aunt after the child's mother has died. While no one is being
accused of wrongdoing here, my perspective would be that the
value centering of the process is still about justice in the sense of
securing the fundamental human rights of that child. For all this,
the fundamental point I wish to make here is that we must not
be misled into allowing a disagreement over language to cloud
a more fundamental agreement over practice and underlying
values.
The S Word
David Moore and I have been in the same hot water from
restorative justice folk who don't like the S word-shame. David
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has made a great contribution by documenting, as summarized in
his contribution to this volume, the profound emotional turning
point that regularly occurs in conferences from collective vulner-
ability or collective shame to acknowledgement that we all have
some ownership of this problem and we are going to fix it. My col-
leagues Eliza Ahmed and Nathan Harris, among others, have also
done important empirical work showing that when injustice oc-
curs, whether a minor act of bullying or a serious crime, we cannot
understand the productive and unproductive ways of responding
to it without understanding the shame that both the victim and
the bully are feeling (Ahmed et al., 2001). As Tom Scheff points
out, we cannot comprehend the origins of World War II without
understanding the collective shame Germans experienced from
the humiliation of Versailles that Hitler so effectively exploited.
Nor can we comprehend the peaceableness of Germany since
World War II without understanding their acknowledgement of
shame after Nuremberg and their reintegration into the world
community through the Marshall Plan and other gestures that
rejected the path of humiliation of the vanquished that had been
followed after World War I.
A belief that understanding the joint emotions of shame and
pride is fundamental to grasping what is productive and coun-
terproductive in restorative justice processes does not mean that
the language of shame provides a politically resonant discourse
for the social movement for restorative justice. It does not. The
political discourse of shame is dangerous because it is so vul-
nerable to appropriation by those who wish to stigmatize and
humiliate. Here I think David Moore and I would agree on how to
use language. But we would also agree that simply because some
people take political shots at our theoretical writings as a result
of our seeing shame as central, we should not be deterred from
evidence-based theory development about shame and restorative
justice.
Conclusion
As Burford and Adams (this volume) argue in their introduc-
tion to this collection, family group conferences can be conceived
as a strategy for reconciling the rights to autonomy of members
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of families and their right to privacy. The conference honors the
private space of the family while leaving the obligation of the
state to protect and safeguard fundamental human rights undi-
minished (especially for children). Burford and Adams draw an
interesting parallel with my work on enforced self-regulation as
a business regulatory strategy (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992: Chap-
ter 4), viewing the family group conference as a form of state-
enforced family self-regulation. Burford and Adams see sociolog-
ical critics of social work as one-sidedly emphasizing the social
control character of social work while some social work educators
one-sidedly romanticize the profession as about empowerment.
If they are right that my work is of some use for reframing
this central duality of the profession, it is because it involves a
normative rejection of both of those one-sided views and also
of any wishy washy middle ground between the two. Rather it
says that social work should have a strong commitment to being
a coercive agent of the state's law and a strong commitment
to empowering citizens to run their own lives. But those two
imperatives are temporally ordered. Social work's presumptive
strategy should be empowerment. But when empowered citizens
use that power to threaten the safety of vulnerable others, then
escalation to more and more coercive interventions should be
inexorable-until safety is secured. Then, and only then, there
can be a dialogue about deescalating intervention to reinstate
community and family empowerment.
Burford and Adams are right that coercion is inevitable and
just in social work practice. What a pyramidal approach to insti-
tutional design can deliver is a strategy for minimizing coercion.
This is because the paradox of the pyramid is that by signaling
inexorable escalation until justice is secured, more of the action
is driven down to the deliberative base of the pyramid. People
are most likely to take responsibility for securing the rights of
vulnerable others when the institutional design shows them that
failure to do so is a slippery slope to responsibility to secure
those rights being taken from them. The state's taking over that
responsibility is not threatened in the foreground but threaten-
ing in the background. Social workers should proceed on their
routine work of empowerment not by making judgments that
some people are fit to accept responsibility and others not. By
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assuming that all people have a willingness to take responsibility
for securing the rights of vulnerable others with whom they are
in close relationships until that presumption is proved wrong, by
seeing all people as having multiple selves that include socially
responsible and irresponsible selves, social work practice is about
empowerment to coax and caress the socially responsible self to
the fore. It is about building democratic problem solving, but
equally it is about enforcing the democracy's human rights and
freedoms when democratic deliberation fails to honor them.
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